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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
employer the insurer of the employee. 16 It would seem that the principal
case is contrary to the weight of authority 7 and to the purpose and express
language of the statute. 8
HmBERT B. LEvinE
PUBLIC OFFICERS - LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO PERFORM
DUTY OWED TO INDIVIDUAL
The defendant, an employee of the Louisiana State Society for the Pre-
vention of Cruelty to Animals, refused in violation of a statutory dutya to
destroy a rabid dog when requested by a third person. Subsequently, the
plaintiff's minor son was bitten by the dog and died. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana, in an action for wrongful death, held that the father had a
right of action against the employee and his insurer.2
The question of a public officer's liability in a case of this nature, de-
pends on whether the statute created a duty to the particular plaintiff as
well as to the general public.3 If the duty is merely to the public, a failure
to perform the duty is a public rather than an individual injury and can only
be redressed by a public prosecution.' If the plaintiff can prove he was
owed a duty and was injured by the nonperformance of that duty, the courts
have said he was "specially and peculiarly injured ' 5 and have allowed re-
covery against the negligent officer.6
Failures to make an entry in a bank record,7 remove an infectious vault,'
inspect playground facilities, 9 maintain and repair bridges,' 0 publish names
of election nominees," accept the lowest bid on a paving contract' 2 and
protect private property against rioters'3 have been held to involve only a
duty to the public as a whole. For this reason, officers have escaped lia-
bility even where their nonfeasance has resulted in grave injury to the
plaintiff.14 Courts often have taken the position that if relief were granted
in such cases, there would be a wrongful diversion of public funds for every
failure to stop a fire or suppress a riot. 5
In cases in which a public officer has been held liable to an individual
plaintiff for his failure to act in accordance with a statutory mandate, the
courts have considered the duty owed to the plaintiff as a direct rather than
an incidental purpose of the statute. Thus, failures to inspect a road near
the home of a plaintiff specially assessed for that road,' 6 to remove flush-
boards from a dam which overlooked the lands of the plaintiff'7 and to
ascertain the absence of personal property before levying taxes upon real
"See Livingston v. Henry and Hall, 59 So.2d 892, 896 (L.a. App. 1952) (dissent-
ing opinion). PR1OSSrR, TORTs 533 (1941).
1 7ProssSR, ToRTs, 538 (1941)
'Brookhaven, Steam Laundryt v. Watts, 59 So.2d 294 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1952), re-
versng 55 So.2d 381 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1951).
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property' were held to involve a special duty to the individual injured and
recovery against the negligent officer was granted.
It would seem that in the principal case the statute involved did not
create a special duty to the plaintiff, and, therefore, in allowing recovery
the court did not follow the rule requiring a special duty to a particular
plaintiff in order to create liability.19 However, since the defendant in the
principal case was insured, the courts holding may not be a rejection of the
requirement of the showing of a special duty in light of the fact that Louisi-
ana law has placed greater responsibility for tortious injury upon defendants
who are protected by isurance than upon those not insured.20
GERALD S. GOLD
"'The Louisiana State Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals through its
agents shall destroy any vicious dogs found in violation of this ordinance wich
cannot be safely taken up or impounded. "" New Orleans Ordinance No. 14578
C.C.S. § 17-18 (1937) authorized by LA. REv. STAT. tit. 3:2735 § 1 (1926 as
amended in 1948).
'Serpas v. Margiotta, 59 So.2d 492 (La. Sup. Ct. 1952).
'E.g., Stevens v. North State Motor, Inc. 161 Minn. 345, 201 N.W 435 (1925).
'2 COOLEY, TORTS 389 (4th ed. 1932).
'Gage v. Springer, 211 Ill. 200, 203, 71 N.E. 860, 862 (1904).
" Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342, 5 N.W 403 (1880); Wright v. Shanahan, 149
N.Y. 495, 44 N.E. 74 (1896).
"Svenson v. Brix, 156 Ore. 236, 64 P.2d. 830 (1937).
'Bryant v. City of S. Paul, 33 Minn. 289, 23 N.W 220 (1885).
'Smith v. Iowa City, 23 Iowa 391, 239 N.W 29 (1931).
" Strahan v. Fussel, 218 La. 682, 50 So.2d. 805 (1951).
"People for the use of Lamar Publishing Co. v. Hoag, 54 Colo. 542, 131 Pac. 400
(1913).
"Colorado Paving Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (8th Cir. 1897).
"Western College of Homeopathic Medicine v. City of Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375
(1861).
" Miller v. Ouray Electric Light and Power Co., 18 Colo. App. 131, 70. Pac. 447
(1902); Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Iowa 495 (1872).
"Gage v. Springer, 211 Ill. 200, 71 N.E. 860 (1904); Coolidge v. Brookline, 114
Mass. 572 (1874); Riddle v. Merrimack River Locks, 7 Mass. 169 (1810); Board
of Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 111 (1857)
"Gage v. Springer, 211 Ill. 200, 71 N.E. 860 (1904).
'Wright v. Shanahan, 149 N.Y. 495, 44 N.E. 74 (1896).
"Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342, 5 N.W 403 (1880).
"A special duty is one owed an individual who has a peculiar private interest as
distinguished from that which he has in common with other members of the com-
munity. In the present case the plaintiffs decedent was owed no duty other than
trhe general duty owed.to the public. The fact that he was injured does not create
a special duty. Cfi Miller v. Ouray Light and Power Co., 18 Colo. App. 131, 70
Pac. 447 (1902); Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Iowa 495 (1872); Western College
of.Homeopathic Medicine.v. City of Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375 (1861)'.
'Cf. Rome.v. -London and Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 181 La. 630, 169
So. 132 (1936).
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